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Collateral Attack on Foreign, Ex Parte Divorce
Decrees: A Virginia Case
J.

WESTWOOI

SMITHEES

Ten years ago it was reported that a bill had been introduced in the Nevada legislature to grant divorces by slot
machine. "The divorce seeker would punch the machine once
a day for 42 days, to establish residence, then insert 200 silver
dollars. As the divorce popped out of a slot, colored lights
would flash, wheels spin, and a jukebox would play America."
Time, Mar. 21, 1949, p. 26, col. 2.
The bill did not pass. But the liberality of existing divorce
laws of Nevada and several other "divorce-mill" States has
attracted many divorce seekers from all parts of the country,
including Virginia. The "migratory divorces" so obtained
have given rise to difficult Conflict of Laws problems, one of
which will be briefly discussed here.
When a husband and wife live in Virginia and one of them
visits Nevada to obtain a decree of absolute divorce, without
any service of process on the other in Nevada and without
any appearance by the defendant in the divorce suit, what
effect does such a decree have in Virginia? (1) Are Virginia
courts required by the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, to
recognize and give effect to such a decree? (2) If the constitutional mandate is not applicable, is it desirable that such
a decree nevertheless be recognized and given effect under
so-called principles of "comity"?
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Evans v. Asphalt
Roads & Materials Co., 194 Va. 165 (1952) had a case involving this problem and rendered an important decision that
seems to have escaped the notice of all the law reviews.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss that decision and
the court's opinion in the case primarily with reference to
the first of the two questions stated above.
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The Case.
The case arose in this way. Roy N. Evans, an employee of
the Asphalt Roads & Materials Co., was killed in 1950 in an
accident arising out of and in the scope of his employment.
His dependents were entitled to compensation under the
Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act. A fifteen year old
son, Kiah Evans, claimed to be his sole dependent, but Mae
Lawson Evans, who was living with the decendent as his wife
at the time of the accident, claimed a share of the compensation as his lawful wife, under Va. Code Ann. §65-63 (1950).
Whether or not she was the wife of the deceased employee
at the time of the accident depended upon the validity of her
Nevada marriage to him in 1946. This in turn depended upon
the validity of two prior Nevada divorces: his divorce from
his first wife, Sallie Evans, and her divorce from her first
husband, Floyd Smith.
The facti concerning the divorces were not unique. Mr.
Evans and his wife, Sallie, were living on 4th Street in Ocean
View, Virginia in 1945 when he went to Radford, Virginia to
work. While there he met Mrs. Mae Lawson Smith, who had
separated from her husband and was living in Pulaski, Virginia. After about three months they decided to marry, and in
order to free themselves of their respective spouses planned to
obtain Nevada divorces. They went to Reno, Nevada (in
August, 1945, according to her later testimony), einpl6ye'd
the same lawyer, and filed their suits for divorce-one in
June, 1946 and the other two weeks later, in July. With
regard to whether she intended to make her home in Nevada
Mrs. Smith-Evans (as she will hereinafter sometimes be
referred to) later testified in a hearing before the Chairman
of the Industrial Commission of Virginia: "I just meant to
return as soon as possible, I did not think I would be living
out there very long. We thought we might not be there a
year."
In his divorce suit, Mr. Evans gave his wife's last known
address as "Oceanview Drive, Norfolk, -Virginia," although
he knew that she had moved with their children from Ocean
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View, Virginia, to Candler, North Carolina. Notice of his
suit was mailed to Norfolk and was returned undelivered to
Nevada. Mrs. Sallie Evans testified in the hearing referred
to above that she knew nothing of this divorce suit until Mr.
Evans' death in 1950.
In her divorce suit, Mrs. Smith's affidavit gave the last
known address of her husband as "General Delivery, Pulaski
Virginia", although she admitted (in the same hearing referred to) that she knew that he lived at Hiwassee in Pulaski
County, Virginia, and that mail intended to reach him should
have been addressed to him at the Hiwassee Post Office. She
explained: "I did not care whether he got it or not."
Notice of both suits was published in a Reno newspaper.
Neither of the defendants entered an appearance, nor were
they served with process.
On September 11, 1946 the Nevada court entered decrees of
absolute divorce in these companion cases. On October 19,
1946 Mr. Evans and Mrs. Smith went through a ceremony of
marriage in Nevada. In March, 1947 they returned to Pulaski,
Virginia (and lived together until his death in 1950.)
(It should be explained that the decedent's first wife, Mrs.
Sallie Evans, did not claim compensation as a dependent. She
had brought suit in North Carolina for divorce from Mr.
Evans on the ground of desertion and in June, 1947 had
obtained a decree of absolute divorce, upon constructive service of process; she had also been awarded custody of their
children.)
In the hearing before the Chairman of the Industrial Commission of Virginia it was found as a fact that neither Mr.
Evans nor Mrs. Smith ever had any intention to make a home
in Nevada. The Commissioner's opinion stated: "They were
sojourners for one sole purpose and that was to secure a
divorce, which they knew could not otherwise be obtained."
His opinion then stated, as conclusions of law, that neither
of them acquired a domicil in Nevada, that Nevada courts had
no jurisdiction to grant them divorces, and that the Nevada
decrees were null and void. The Commissioner therefore ruled
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that Mrs. Smith-Evans was not the lawful wife of Mr. Evans
at the time of his accident, and entered an award in favor of
the son, Kiah Evans, as sole dependent.
In a review of the case, the full Industrial Commission
affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached
by the hearing Commissioner and affirmed the award entered
thereon.
Mrs. Smith-Evans appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the case to the Industrial
Commission, with direction to amend the award to include the
appellant as the widow of the deceased, and to divide the
compensation between her and the dependent child, Kiah
Evans.
In its opinion the court stated the major question to be
whether the minor son of the deceased employee
had the right to attack the validity of a divorce granted
his father in the State of Nevada. The issue turns on
the effect in Virginia of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the Federal Constitution, Article IV, §1, and the Act
of Congress in pursuance thereof, 28 U. S. C. §1738, 28
U. S. C. A. §1738.
If the answer is in the negative we do not reach other
questions in the case. [194 Va. at 167.]
Again, the court said at page 170:
In view of the particular issue under discussion, that
is, what effect we must give, under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution, to the judicial proceedings of Nevada, it has not been neccessary to set
out in detail evidence of fraud in matters on which the
divorce decrees were rendered. Our primary considerations are: first, whether the divorce decrees are absolutely void or merely voidable; and, second, if merely
voidable, whether they are subject to collateral attack
by the appellees.
It will be noted that the Supreme Court of Appeals did not
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go into the factual question as to whether Mr. Evans and Mrs.
Smith had the intent requisite for the acquisition of domicils
in Nevada, nor did the court hold that they had acquired
domicils there. Confining itself "largely to the validity of the
decree granted Evans," since the contentions of the appellees
were particularly directed to that decree, the court held that
this decree was not void, but "at most voidable only", and
that decisions of the United States Supreme Court required
Virginia to give the same effect to this decree, with regard to
susceptibility to collateral attack, as would be given to it by
Nevada, the State of rendition. In reaching this conclusion
the court relied primarily on the case of Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581, 71 S. Ct. 474 (1951), in which-"they said"the controlling issue was identical with that here." At the
end of its discussion of the problem, the court's opinion stated,
at page 179:
The appellees, upon whom the burden rested, have not
shown that they, or either of them would be permitted
to make a collateral attack on the decree in the courts of
Nevada. In that situation, the decree is not susceptible
to attack by them in the State of Virginia. Johnson v.
Melberger, supra.
.... "
In order to consider the validity of this holding, it becomes
necessary to examine Johnson v. Muelberger, supra, and other
Supreme Court decisions, as well as lesser authorities in the
field of divorce jurisdiction.
Jurisdictionfor Divorce and Full Faith and Credit.
In the first place it is well established that a suit for divorce
is not a mere adversary or in personam proceeding and that
personal jurisdiction over both spouses-without more-does
not amount to jurisdiction to divorce them. Since divorce
involves the dissolution or termination of the marriage relation, it is a matter of concern to society and to the State in
which the spouses make their home, that is, the State of their
domicil. If both spouses are domiciled in the same State, that
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State has jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. Furthermore,
since the first of the two celebrated Williams cases it has been
settled that a State in which one spouse has a bona fide domicil
has jurisdiction to change his status by a decree of divorce,
although the other spouse is domiciled elsewhere, and other
States must give full faith and credit to such a decree.
Williams v. North Carolina,317 U. S.287, 63 S. Ct. 207 (1942).
But a State in which neither spouse is domiciled is without
jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage by divorce. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §111 (1934). And a decree of divorce
granted on constructive service by the courts of a State in
which neither spouse is domiciled is not entitled to full faith
and credit in the courts of other States. Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S.
175, 21 S.Ct. 551 (1901).
The Virginia court in the Evans case seemed to attach
undue significance to the fact that the "Evans divorce decree
...was entered in a court of general jurisdiction, which under
the pleadings, the evidence and the findingg of that court, had
jurisdiction over the complainant and the subject matter involved." 194 Va. at 171. It cites Esenwein v. Peinsylvania,
325 U. S.279, 65 S.Ct. 1118 (1945) for the propositibn that the
full faith and credit clause "places on us the duty to accord
prima facie validity to the decree obtained by Evans." Id. at
172. But it was established in 1874 in the case of Thompson v.
Whitman, that "the jurisdiction of the court by which a judgment is rendered in any State may be questioned in a collateral
proceeding in another State, notwithstanding the [full faith
and credit mandate] and notwithstanding the averments contained in the record of the judgment itself." 18 Wall. 457, 21
L. Ed. 897 (1874). And in the Esenwein case, cited, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Pennsylvania court's refusal to
accept the Nevada divorce court's finding and recital of jurisdictional facts. Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rightly indicated
that if merely the Nevada decree had been in evidence,
it was entitled to carry the day. But the Supreme Court
[of Pennsylvania] found that on the entire showing there
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was convincing countervailing evidence to disprove petitioner's intention to establish a domicil in Nevada. The
Pennsylvania courts have viewed their Constitutional
duty correctly. [325 U.S. at 281, 65 S. Ct. at 1119.]
In the second Williams case, which the Virginia court oddly
failed to discuss, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, again speaking for
the court, said:
'It is too late now to deny the right collaterally to
impeach a decree of divorce made in another State, by
proof that the court had no jurisdiction, even when the
record purports to show jurisdiction....' It was 'too late'
more than forty years ago. German Savings Society v.
Dormitizer, 192 U. S. 125, 128, 24 S. St. 221, 222. [Williams v. North Carolina,325 U. S. 226, 229, 65 S. Ct. 1092,
1095 (1945).]
In this well known case, Mr. Williams had obtained a decree
of divorce in an ex parte proceeding in Nevada on a finding
by the Nevada court that he was domiciled in that State.
Then, like our Mr. Evans, he married in Nevada a woman
who, like our Mrs. Smith, had gone with him to Nevada to
obtain a divorce from her husband. In a subsequent criminal
prosecution for bigamous cohabitation in North Carolina, the
North Carolina court made a fair inquiry into the facts and
found that Mr. Williams had not been domiciled in Nevadadespite the Nevada court's finding to the contrary. It thereupon held that his Nevada divorce was invalid, his subsequent
marriage in Nevada was invalid and bigamous, and his cohabitation in North Carolina with his second "wife" was an
offense against the criminal laws of that State. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction of Mr. Williams. For a later case
holding that an ex parte divorce decree is not protected from
collateral attack in a sister State, see Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S.
674, 69 S. Ct. 751 (1949).
Although it cannot be asserted with certainty, it seems that
the Virginia court in the Evans case proceeded from a prima
facie presumption of jurisdiction (for which it cited the Esega-
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wein case) to an assumption that jurisdiction existed in the
Nevada court. For it quoted as apposite (at pages 171 and 172
of the opinion) rules taken from American Jurisprudenceand
Corpus JurisSecundum precluding collateral attacks on judgments rendered by courts having jurisdiction. Whereas here
the very question at issue was the jurisdiction vel non of the
Nevada court. And at page 172 it quoted an extract from 1
Black on Judgments, §170, p. 249 (2 ed. 1902), discussing a
"voidable" judgment and concluding: "If emanating from a
court of general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary presumptions of regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral action." But five lines later Black
states that a judgment is void, and not merely voidable,
"where there was a total want of jurisdiction to render it."
And earlier, in the same section of his treatise, he had characterized a void judgment as a nullity which "may be impeached in any action, 'direct or collateral."
Furthermore, at this and other places in the opinion the
Virginia court seems to fail to note the distinction between
domestic and foreign judgments with regard to collateral attack and conclusiveness of the record as to jurisdiction. In
the section quoted from, Black says that "in the case of a
domestic judgment, it is a serious question whether the lack
of jurisdiction must not appear on the face of the record in
order to entitle the courts to treat it as a nullity." But in a
later portion of the same treatise he discusses foreign judgments (including judgments of sister States) and declares
that as to them even recitals *ofjurisdictional facts in the record may be contradicted on collateral attack, making specific
reference to foreign divorce decrees. 2 Black on Judgments,
§901, 930 (2 ed. 1902). In Thompson v. Whitman, supra, Mr.
Justice Bradley said:
The record of the domestic tribunals of England and
some of the States, it is true, are held to import absolute
verity- as well in relation to jurisdictional as to other
facts, in all collateral proceedings. Public policy and the
dignity of the courts are supposed to require that no
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averment shall be admitted to contravert the record. But,
as we have seen, that rule has no extra-territorial force.
[21 L. Ed. at 901.]
Perhaps it should be said that the word "void" does not
have precisely the same meaning in all contexts. If Virginia
is free, under the full faith and credit clause, to treat a foreign
divorce decree rendered without jurisdiction as a nullity or
as "invalid" (as held in the second Williams case) it little
matters whether such a decree be "void" in the State of its
rendition as in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the United States, it is generally thought that a judgment
rendered by the courts of a State that does not have judicial
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter is void
even in the State where rendered. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877). Whether or not this is true of a
divorce decree rendered without jurisdiction has never been
decided by the Supreme Court. See Sutton v. Leib, 342 U. S.
402, 72 S. Ct. 398 (1951). In Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667
(3rd Cir. 1953) a statute of the Virgin Islands, interpreted as
providing for divorce jurisdiction without either spouse being
domiciled in the territory, was held unconstitutional on the
ground that it conflicted with the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. A contrary view has been urged by Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction,22 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 775 (1955).
Res Judicata: The Sherrer Doctrine
Everything that has been said up to this point has pertained
to foreign ex parte divorce decrees, and since both divorce decrees in the Evans case were of this kind, one might think that
this would be the end of the matter. But we have not yet
reached the Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Muelberger,
supra, which the Virginia court regarded as controlling. For
this purpose we should go back to 1931 when the Supreme
Court decided the case of Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelinq
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Mens Ass'n., 283 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517. Here it was held that
the principle of res judicata, in the sense of collateral estoppel, applies to findings of fact on which personal jurisdiction
depends, when the defendant appears, even specially, to contest the court's jurisdiction over him. Having made a special
appearance in an in personam action and having unsuccessfully litigated the issue of jurisdiction, it was held that the
defendant could not thereafter attack the judgment collaterally when an action was brought against him on that judgment. In an oft-quoted statement the court said:
Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation;
that those who have contested an issue 'shall be bound
by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried
shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.
[283 U. S. at 525, 51 S. Ct. at 518.]
In Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938) this principle was extended to the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. A husband having brought suit for divorce in
Virginia, his wife, who was domiciled in the District of Columbia, appeared in the Virginia proceeding to contest the husband's allegations of Virginia domicil. The Virginia court
found that the husband was domiciled in Virginia and granted
the divorce. The Supreme Court held that the wife was precluded by the principle of res judicata from collaterally attacking the Virginia decree in a later proceeding in the
District of Columbia. Both parties having appeared and the
issue having actually been litigated, the question of the husband's domicil was thereafter closed.
In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087 (1948),
a wife left her husband in Massachusetts and brought suit for
divorce in Florida. The defendant appeared in the suit and
filed an answer in which he denied that his wife was domiciled
in Florida, but failed to support his denial either by introducing any evidence on the issue or by cross-examining his
wife when she testified. He limited his own testimony to matters pertaining to the custody of their children. The divorce
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having been granted, the husband later sought to attack it
collaterally in a proceeding in a State court in Massachusetts.
The Supreme Court held that full faith and credit required
Massachusetts to recognize the Florida decree as res judicata
with respect to the jurisdictional fact of domicil, even though
the issue had not actually been litigated, since both parties had
been before the Florida court. In the Supreme Court's opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson said:
It is one thing to recognize as permissible the judicial
re-examination of findings of jurisdictional fact where
such findings have been made by a court of a sister State
which has entered a divorce decree in ex parte proceedings. It is quite another thing to hold that the vital rights
and interests involved in divorce litigation may be held
in suspense pending the scrutiny by courts of sister
States of findings of jurisdictional facts made by a competent court in proceedings conducted in a manner consistent with the highest requirements of due process and
in which the defendant has participated.[334 U. S. at 355,
6 S. Ct. at 1093. (Emphasis added.)]
And in Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094 (1948), decided the same day as the Sherrer case, the same principle
was applied to a decree rendered in a Nevada divorce suit in
which the defendant appeared but raised no question in relation to the plaintiff's domicil. Indeed the defendant in her answer admitted as true the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint relating to his Nevada residence, but filed a crosscomplaint for divorce, which she succeeded in obtaining. Later
she sought to attack the decree collaterally in Massachusetts
on the ground that neither she nor her husband had been
domiciled in Nevada. The Supreme Court held that the Nevada decree was entitled to recognition under the full faith
and credit clause as res judicata on the issue of domicil and
thereby on the issue of jurisdiction of the Nevada court.
In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581, 71 S. Ct. 474
(1951), which the Virginia court regarded as governing its
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decision in the Evans case, the Supreme Court again was
dealing not with an ex parte proceeding but with a Florida
divorce suit in which the defendant spouse had appeared by
attorney and interposed an answer, without questioning the
plaintiff's allegations as to residence in Florida. Later the
defendant husband re-married and still later died, survived
by the latest wife and a daughter of an earlier marriage which
had been terminated by death. By -his will he left his entire
estate to the daughter, but the wife of his last marriage filed
notice of her election to take the statutory one-third share of
the estate under the New York Decedents' Estate Law. The
daughter contested this election on the ground that her father's divorce was invalid and hence his subsequent marriage
was also invalid. The New York Surrogate determined that
since the Florida divorce proceeding had been a contested
proceeding and since it was valid and final in Florida it was
not subject to collateral attack in New York. It was agreed in
all the courts through which this case traveled that the
Sherrer doctrine required New York to accord the Florida
decree the effect of res judicata and to bar from attacking it
collaterally anyone who would be so barred in the courts of
Florida, the granting State.
It should be noted that it is only after the foreign divorce
decree has qualified for full faith and credit under the SIherrer
doctrine that it becomes necessary to inquire what effect
would be given to the decree in the original forum under its
doctrine of res judicata. The New York Court of Appeals investigated the law of Florida and concluded that the courts
of that State would not bar the daughter from collaterally
attacking the divorce decree that had been entered against her
father. The Supreme Court reversed the New York court because it differed in its interpretation of Florida law, saying:
"No Florida case has come to our attention holding that a
child may contest in Florida its parent's' divorce where the
parent was barredfrom contesting, as here by res judicata."
340 U. S. at 587, 71 S. Ct. at 478. (Emphasis added.)
As if to emphasize that the decision in the Johnson case
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would not control a problem such as that in the Virginia
Evans case, Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the court, said:
"The later Williams case left a sister State free to determine
whether there was domicil of one party in an 'ex parte' proceeding so as to give the court jurisdiction to enter a decree."
340 U. S. at 585, 71 S. Ct. at 477.
In Cook v. Cook, 342 U. S. 126, 72 S. Ct. 157 (1951) the distinction between an ex parte divorce decree and a divorce
decree rendered by a court having jurisdiction over both parties was responsible for the addition of a new wrinkle to the
Sherrer doctrine. The record before the Supreme Court
showed that a wife had obtained a decree of divorce in Florida, but did not reveal whether or not the defendant husband
had appeared in the suit or had been personally served in the
divorce State. Under such circumstances the court held that
there was a presumption that.the defendant was personally
subject to the jurisdiction of the divorce court. "That presumption", said Mr. Justice Douglas, in the court's majority
opinion, "may of course be overcome by showing, for example, that Mann [the defendant husband] never was served in
Florida nor made an appearance in the case either generally
or specially to contest the jurisdictional issues." 342 U. S. at
128, 72 S. Ct. at 159.
It should be stated that in this case the party attacking the
divorce decree was not the divorced husband but a second
husband, Cook, who was living under an invalid marriage
with Mrs. Mann at the time of her Florida divorce, which he
encouraged and assisted her to obtain. Having re-married her
after her divorce from Mann, he sought to attack the decree
collaterally in a suit in Vermont to annul both of his marriages to her. All members of the Supreme Court agreed that
if the Florida divorce suit was an ex parte proceeding, Vermont was free to re-open the issue of domicil upon a collateral
attack by a third party and, if domicil were found lacking, to
deny recognition to the Florida decree. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting only because he interpreted the Vermont Su-

COLLATERAL ATTACK ON FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES

91

preme Court's opinion as obliquely indicating such a finding,
said:
If Mrs. Mann did not have a Florida domicile and her
husband did not submit, under the Sherrer doctrine ... to
the State's jurisdiction, Florida had no power to terminate the marriage. If there was no jurisdiction to grant
a divorce, there was no divorce. The sham divorce was a
nullity, no more binding on the Vermont courts than
would have been a private letter to the lady by the local
Florida judge. And while Vermont could, if that State
chose, deny relief to Cook because of his 'unclean hands,'
the Constitution of the United States has nothing to do
with that defense. [342 U. S. at 130, 72 S. Ct. at 160.]
It is believed that the Virginia court in the Evans case erred
in holding that the Sherrer doctrine, as applied in Johnson v.
Muelberger, supra, was applicable to the ex parte divorce decrees which it was considering. Annot., 28 A. L. R. 2d 13031
1330 (1953). If it had followed the decisions of the Supreme
Court as here interpreted it would have held that the two
Nevada divorce decrees, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it,
were no more binding on the Industrial Commission of Virginia than private letters to Mr. Evans and Mrs. Smith by
the local Nevada judge. And the fifteen year old son of the
deceased workman might well have received the entire compensation for his father's death, instead of being required to
share it with the woman who participated, with the father, in
obtaining the sham divorces in Nevada.
Estoppel
With regard to the second question stated at the beginning
of this discussion, brief mention may be made of the doctrine
of estoppel as it might affect the Evans case, althougli limitations of space will not permit an adequate discussion here. The
doctrine is referred to in the court's opinion, but it is not clear
whether the court considers significant in this respect the law
of Nevada or the law of Virginia or both. It cites McNeir v.
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McNeir, 178 Va. 285 (1941) for the proposition that "one who
has participated in the obtaining of a fraudulent divorce is
estopped to deny its invalidity [sic.]. The bar of estoppel is as
effective as to parties and their privies as that of res judicata
when the latter doctrine is applicable." 194 Va. at 172. (It
could hardly be held that a minor son seeking compensation
for his father's death is privy to his father's divorce, and certainly he is not in privity with his father's second wife with
respect to her divorce from a former husband.) Later the
court says that "no Nevada case has been called to our attention holding that a child may contest in Nevada its parents'
divorce, where the parent was barred from contesting, as here,
by estoppel." But in the same paragraph it says that "it has
been held in Nevada that fraud in alleging or establishing required residence in a divorce action is a jurisdictional fact
and not available as a ground to annul the decree. Confer v.
Second Judicial District Court, 49 Nev. 18, 234 Pac. 688, 236
Pac. 1097 [1925]." Id. at 177. It happens that both the McNeir
and Confer cases, unlike the case at bar, were not ex parte
proceedings, and the NE "ada case seems to involve the doctrine of res judicata rather than that of estoppel.
Apparently as part of the same general idea, the court
states: "Under the common law of England, the right to collaterally attack the validity of a judgment is restricted to persons having a pre-existing interest at the time the judgment
was rendered. Upton v. Basset, Vol. 1, C[r]oke's Rep., Eliz.
445, [78 Eng. Rep. 685.]" And since Nevada has adopted the
common law, the Virginia court presumes that the Upton case
is law in Nevada. Id. at 175. The writer has been unable to
find anything in the Upton case remotely resembling a judgment. The issue in that case can best be stated by quoting from
the report:
Trespass. Upon demurrer the case was, that the plaintiff and defendant claimed by several leases from one
and the same person. The plaintiff in his replication avers
that the defendant's lease was made upon fraud, but
shows not any fine by himself paid for his lease nor any
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rent reserved thereupon, nor any other valuable consideration wherefore it was made. Whereupon the defendant
demurred thereto.
It seems that most, if not all, authorities accepting this requirement of a pre-existing interest do so with respect to
domestic judgments which are valid, (i.e., not void for want of
jurisdiction) but which allegedly were procured by fraud. See
Black on Judgments §289 (2 ed. 1902) and Restatement, Judgments §93, Com. b. (1942). See also Annot., 12 A. L. R. 2d 718
(1950). It is not believed that such a requirement is an established rule of the common law applicable to foreign judgments
rendered by the courts of a state that is devoid of jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter.
The court quotes with approval the gist of a paragraph
from an unsigned note in 50 Colum. L. Rev. 833 (1950), whose
author "decries the wisdom of allowing a child to make a
collateral attack upon his parents' divorce as a means of enforcing state policy." 194 Va. at 175. In one of the two footnotes appended to that paragraph the author cites the Restatement, Conflict of Laws §112, caveat (1934). Insofar as
applicable here, the caveat states that the American Law Institute refrains from expressing an opinion as to whether the
children of a prior marriage may be precluded from questioning the validity of a divorce decree when the party obtaining
it is estonped to do so. The author fails to note, however, that
at the time he cited it the caveat had been deleted by the
American Law Institute and the following statement had been
substituted for it: "Any person may be precluded from questioning the validity of a divorce decree if, under all the circumstances, his conduct has led to the obtaining of the divorce
decree, or for any other reason has been such as to make it
inequitable to permit him to deny the validity of the divorce
decree." Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 1948 Supp., §112,
Com. c. See also Restatement, (Second) Conflict of Laws §112
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953). And one of the most respected
authorities in the field states that, while a party procuring an
invalid divorce will be* estopped from later asserting any

94

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW NOTES

rights as spouse, "there is no estoppel present to prevent
the state or children of the first marriage from setting up the
invalidity of the divorce decree." Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
§127, p. 402 (3 ed. 1949).
In any event, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in his opinion
in the Cook case, quoted above, the Constitution of the United
States has nothing to do with that defense. Full faith and
credit does not require a second State to consult the estoppel
doctrines of the State in which an ex parte divorce decree is
entered without jurisdiction. "The doctrine [of estoppel] is
determined in each case, not by the law of the state which
granted the divorce, but by the law of the state in which the
divorce is questioned. Each State of the United States is
therefore free, at least within broad limits, to determine the
doctrine's scope and range of effect." Restatement, (Second)
Conflict of Laws §112, Com. a. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953).
It is hoped that the Virginia court will ponder long before
adopting, as a precept of Virginia law, a rule that a minor
child is per se estopped to challenge the validity of his parent's sham divorce, obtained by fraud without participation
by his other parent, and granted by a divorce-mill State
without any jurisdiction in the premises.

